Introduction
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the extant corporate governance (CG) and earnings management (EM) literature by distinctively examining how and why a firm's CG and Islamic governance (IG) mechanisms may influence its EM practices. Specifically, we investigate the extent to which a broad composite CG index, IG committee and other CG variables can explain observable changes in firm-level EM in Oman.
Although a number of previous studies have examined the association between CG and corporate EM practices (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Chen & Zhang, 2012; Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012; Anglin et al., 2013; Albu & Girbin, 2015) , a careful evaluation of this literature reveals a number of weaknesses. First, despite increasing evidence that CG mechanisms underpinned by agency driven rational/opportunistic economic motives and formal structures alone may not be able to fully explain underlying managerial motivations for engaging in EM (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008) and thus new theoretical perspectives, such as behavioural theory, may need to be considered (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) , existing studies are still overhemingly informed by the ubiquitous agency theoretical perspective (Davidson et al., 2005; Mitra & Cready, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007) .
Second, Judge (2010) shows that the extent to which formal and informal CG structures/rules are used differ around the world. For example, equity markets tend to be the main CG mechanisms in AngloSaxon economies (e.g., UK and US) compared with concentrated ownership structures in Continental European (e.g., German and Italy), African (e.g., South Africa and Nigeria) and Asian (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore) economies. Similarly, CG structures in Scandinavian economies (e.g., Norway and Sweden) are dominated by social norms rooted in egalitarianism/utopianism cormpared with Shariah law in Isamic (e.g., Oman and Saudi Arabia) countries. In transition economies (e.g., China and Russia), however, the primary CG mechanism is often the state/informal networks, whilst in other countries (e.g., India, South Korea and Japan), business groups tend to be the main CG mechanism. Despite these differences in CG arrangements around the world, existing studies have focused disproportionately on evaluating the effect of Anglo-American CG mechanisms on EM to the neglect of the others (Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012) , and thereby arguably impairing current understanding of the impact of CG on EM in different economies.
Third, although a number of studies have investigated the link between CG and EM (Schipper, 1989; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; McNichols, 2000; Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2008) , they are observably concentrated in a few developed countries, such as UK and US, which tend to have largely similar CG, economic, legal and institutional contexts (Chia et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 2008; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012) . However, it can be argued that in developing countries, such as Oman with different CG, economic and legal environment, the extent to which formal CG mechanisms are able to restrain managerial ability to engage in EM may differ, and thus the association between CG and EM can be expected to vary from the findings of prior studies that were conducted in developed countries. In particular, behavioural theory suggests that managerial/corporate board decision-making may not only be influenced by their expertise, knowledge and skills, but also their experiences, beliefs and values (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) .
Indeed, there is an emerging behavioural literature, which shows that individual/corporate religious/cultural beliefs can affect their: (i) decision-making (Hilary & Hui, 2009 ) and risk-taking behaviour (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008) ; (ii) corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Brammer et al., 2007) , equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012) , social norms, cohesion and CG (Boytsun et al., 2011) and corrupt (Mensah 2014) practices; (iii) willingness to engage in tunnelling/expropriate shareholders' wealth (Du, 2013 (Du, , 2014 , evade tax/commit tax fraud (Stack 2006; Richardson 2008) , financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012) , philanthropy and EM (Callen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) . A major issue, however, is that these studies have mainly been conducted within the Judo-Christian contexts to the neglect of others, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism. In the case of Islam, although there are extensive normative/critical reviews relating to the distinctiveness of IG srtuctures (Lewis, 2005; Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010) , empirical evidence on how such IG mechanisms may drive corporate outcomes and practices, such as disclosure, performance, CSR, risk-taking and EM are rare (Safieddine, 2009; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Ginena, 2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015; Al-Bassam & Ntim, 2016) . This also impairs current understanding of how IG mechanisms may impact on EM practices.
Consequently, this paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature by addressing some of the articulated limitations of prior studies. First, we offer new empirical insights on the CG-EM nexus by grounding our study in the emerging behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance, in which corporate decision-making is not only assumed to be underlined by formal incentives and CG mechanisms, but also informal CG arrangements, bounded rationality, political bargaining, routinisation and satisficing behaviour (van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) . In this case, we distinctively depart from the dominant agency theoretical framework that is underpinned mainly by formal CG structures, rational economic motives, managerial opportunism and optimising behaviour.
Second, existing studies have mostly examined how individual CG mechanisms (e.g., board size and independent directors) can affect corporate EM practices. However, recent evidence suggests that CG structures tend to interrelate (i.e., CG structures are used in bundles) in order to be effective (Ntim et al., 2015a, b) , and therefore examining direct associations between individual CG structures and EM may lead to spurious correlations. We overcome this limitation by investigating the relationship between a committee); (iii) increased commitment to Islamic religious beliefs and values. As previously noted and from a behavioural theoretical perspective, greater commitment to Islamic religious values is important because previous studies suggest that Judo-Christian religious beliefs and values can impact on serveral corporate practices, including EM (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008; Richardson, 2008; Hilary & Hui, 2009; Callen et al., 2011; McGuire et al., 2012) . A major way by which Islamic religious beliefs and values can be incorporated into corporate operations and decision-making is through the establishment and operation of the Shariah supervisory board (Mollah & Zaman, 2015) , whose central role is to certify whether corporate investments are Shariah compliant. Third and similar to most developing countries, Omani firms are characterised by high levels of concentrated ownership, primarily by families and government (Najib, 2007; Omran et al., 2008; Bishara, 2011) . This is important because concentrated ownership structures can render the markets for corporate control, capital, services, executive talent and labour meant to discipline underperforming managers and corporations ineffective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Jaggi and Tsui, 2007; Alves, 2012; Chen and Zhang, 2012) , and thereby often leading to managerial entrenchment.
Whilst these contextual issues are interesting, they also raise the question of whether a UK-style voluntary CG Code can be effective in improving CG standards and performance, including reducing EM. We, thus, examine the extent to which CG and IG mechanisms may drive corporate EM practices in Oman.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of the institutional framework for Oman. The subsequent sections present the theoretical literature, review past empirical studies and develop hypotheses, present data and research methodology and report the empirical findings and discussion, whilst the final section summarises and concludes the paper. As briefly noted previously, the Omani CG regulatory framework was institutionalised through the issuance of the UK-style 2002 voluntary Code of good CG practices. The Code's publication was mainly attributed to two key factors. First, sharp declines in Muscat Security Market's (MSM) value of listed firms in 1997 had a negative impact on the Omani economy in general and firms in particular (Fleety, 2010) . The government had to make major corporate policy reforms in order to respond to such negative effects. Second, Oman was also influenced by a worldwide proliferation of self-regulatory initiatives that aimed at improving CG standards as a potential remedy for corporate failures. Discernibly, the Omani Code adopted UK-style voluntary compliance and enforcement regime ('comply or explain'). Specifically, the CG provisions and principles (e.g., accountability, fairness, independence, honesty, integrity and transparency) contained in the Omani Code was drawn mainly from the 1992 UK Cadbury Report, principally in relation to the composition and functions of the board of directors. For example, it advocated a UK-style one-tier corporate board, consisting of executive and nonexecutive directors, whose operations are supported by a number of subcommitees, including audit, nomination and remuneration committees. The central objective of these board structures is to enhance CG, disclosure and transparency by improving accounting, auditing, internal control and risk management systems. Additionally, Oman has made explicit efforts at developing and improving the institutional framework for accounting and auditing. For example, Oman is one of the first countries in the MENA region to have fully adopted International Accounting Standards ( IASs) and subsequently, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with the main objective of increasing investor confidence and improving the credibility, comparability and quality of financial reports of Omani firms, and thereby reducing the extent of EM.
Institutional framework for Oman
As previously noted and apart from pursuing CG, accounting and auditing reforms, the Omani corporate context is uniquely and interestingly characterised by hierarchical social structures, increased corporate commitment towards incorporating Islamic religious beliefs and values into corporate operations and concentrated ownership structures. This characterisation is typically evident in the establishment and operation of Shariah supervisory boards (SSB), whose main role is to certify whether corporate operations and investments are consistent with the tenents of Shariah law. Commitment to Islamic religious beliefs and values is of keen relevance to the current study because prior studies suggest that Judo-Christian religious beliefs and values can have an impact on a number of corporate decisions, including managerial commitment to engage in EM. Overall, and whilst these contextual issues are interesting, they also raise the question of whether a UK-style voluntary CG Code can be effective in improving CG standards and performance, including reducing EM. We, therefore, investigate the extent to which CG and IG mechanisms may affect corporate EM practices in Oman. 
Behavioural theoretical framework
Although a number of previous studies have examined the effect of a number of different CG mechanisms on corporate EM practices (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Cornett et al., 2008; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012) , they are mostly informed by insights drawn from agency theory and often report conflicting findings (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993) . Observably, agency theory is underpinned by rational economics, optimising and opportunistic behaviour arising from assumed information asymmetry between corporate agents (managers) and principals (shareholders) (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) . Agency theory, therefore, places emphasis on establishing formal CG structures, incentives and control mechanism to curb managerial opportunism and self-serving behaviour. However, increasing empirical evidence suggests that agency theory's heavy reliance on formal CG strucures, complete and/or perfect contractual (e.g., bonding and monitoring contracts) arrangements, blanket assumptions of managerial distrust, opportunistic and self-serving behaviour, rational economic incentives and control mechanisms have failed to provide full explanations for the various actual managerial/corporate motives for engaging in EM. Noticeably, the rational economic (agency theory) approach has been dominant/ubiquitous because of lack of a stronger non-economic alternative (van Ees et al., 2009) , and therefore recent years have witnessed increasing clarion calls for alternative theoretical perspectives to be considered (Daily et al., 2003; Hambrick et al., 2008) .
In response to these calls, increasing number of researchers have particularly highlighted the need to examine behavioural processes and interactions among directors in order to fully understand the preconditions for achieving effective CG arrangements (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) . Specifically and drawing on the behavioural theory of the firm, van Ees et al. (2009) have proposed a behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance, which posits that in practice, instituting optimal formal governance structures aimed at resolving conflict of interests arising from rational economic motives and opportunistic behaviour may be less of a concern for corporate boards, and instead boards may be more concerned with providing practical solutions to problems of co-ordination, communication, planning, control and information processing.
In particular, van Ees et al. (2009, pp.311-313) have outlined the four main behavioural assumptions that underline behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance in sharp contrast to those of the rational economics (agency) approach, including: (i) bounded rationality; (ii) satisficing behaviour; (iii) routinisation; and (iv) political bargaining. First and in contrast to the agency driven assumption of unbounded rationality, bounded rationality refers to the concept that there is a limit to corporate decision makers' cognitive ability to continuously process large amounts of complex information and find optimal solutions to complex problems. Thus, rationality is very expensive as a great amount of cognitive effort is required in order to be able to implement complex rational rules, which may still not be able to necessarily deliver optimal solutions. Bounded rationality, therefore, suggests that top management (e.g., corporate boards) decision-making processes may be improved by following simplified 7 decision-making rules, as the highly complex environment (i.e., internal and external economic, cultural, political, social and technological environment) within which modern corporations operate can render it very difficult to fully appreciate the various connections among all relevant variables.
However, bounded rationality does not necessarily suggest that the decision-makers are not attempting to maximise utility or achive optimal solutions; just that they are constrained by their cognitive and decision-making limitations. In this case, a behavioural theoretical explanation based on cognitive biases and limitations can be offered for any poor and inefficient decisions that have been made by management rather than simply attributing them to managerial opportunism and self-serving behaviour.
For example, due to cognitive and information processing limitations, managers may make decisions (e.g., in reaching a forecasted or actual annual earnings figure) based on a selection of information rather than the complete information available. This may lead to corporate inefficiencies and failures, but it will be inappropriate to attribute such failures only to managerial opportunism instead of possible cognitive biases and incompetence.
Second, satisficing behaviour suggests that decision-makers tend to choose practical options that are just sufficient or 'good enough' to meet/satisfy current needs rather than look for the theoretically optimal solution. That is, any divergence from the theoretically optimal solution cannot be construed as opportunistic agent behaviour as the objective is to seek satificing solution that meet current needs or challenges. Consequently, behavioural theory suggests that the introduction of 'satisficing behaviour' instead of 'optimal behaviour' can minimise the possible benefits that agents may receive from engaging in opportunistic decisions. Hence, the importance of personal utility maximising behaviour being the major determinant of managerial decisions may be reduced -with organisational decisions not viewed necessarily as optimal solutions, but rather as practical solutions that meet current specific needs/aspirations. The current levels of aspiration ('satisfying goals') are set based on history (e.g., past performance) and social environment (e.g., peer group -industry and size). For example, a company may simply set its future earnings target by referring to its past and/or peer group performance rather than being presented always as a complex opportunistic attempt by managers to deliberately manage earnings either upwards or downwards for their own personal gain. Third, van Ees et al. (2009, p.312 ) define routine as "standard operating procedures" or "…as the codified memory of the organization; embodying the past experience, knowledge, beliefs, values, and capabilities of the organization and its decision makers". Thus, routines tend to be (often taken-forgranted) tacit knowledge developed over many years and are widely accepted within an organisation, easily becoming part of the organisation's beliefs, capabilities, culture, experiences, knowledge and values. In this case, routinisation of decision-making can be a vital source of corporate unity and control by eliminating conflicts of interests and conserving cognitive efforts required in reaching optimal decision, often through prolonged discussions and negotiations. Similar to decision making under bounded rationality and satisficing behaviour, decisions made based on routines can also be biased and thus lead to organisation inefficiencies and failures, but divergence from optimal decisions cannot be attributed only to 8 managerial self-serving behaviour instead of possible inherent limitations associated with the organisational rountines themselves.
The final assumption underlying behaviouraly theory boards and governance is that it views corporations as complex coalitions of stakeholders engaged in continuous political bargaining. In this case, corporations are viewed as complex political system, consisting of coalitions and sub-coalitions of different stakeholders with different objectives and preferences. Distinct from agency theory, goal conflicts are resolved via negotiations and political barganining instead of alignment of rational economic motives by monitoring and incentivising managers. Therefore, organisational objectives and goals reflect the variety of goals and objectives that are pursued by the different stakeholders of coalitions and subcoalitions, which shift contantly through negotiations and political bargaining and problem solving processes that are aimed at achieving the objectives set by the dominant coalition.
To sum up, behavioural theory indicates that due to cognitive and information processing limitations, organisational actors are rarely able to fully assess all available alternatives during decisionmaking. Instead pragmatic solutions that are typically satisfactory in terms resolving immediate/current problems are sought. Such satisficing solutions are often inherent wihin the organisational routines and heuristics based on capabilities, beliefs, experiences, feelings/intutions, knowledge and values that are often taken-for-granted. Finally, goal formation and emerging conflicts are resolved through continuous process of negotiation and political bargaining towards achieving the objectives set by the dominant coalition. We, therefore, employ this behavioural theoretical perspective in developing our hypotheses and interpreting our findings.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Prior studies have examined: (i) the link between CG structures (e.g., board characteristics) and EM (Chung et al., 2002; Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Davidson et al., 2005; Mitra & Cready, 2005; Lin et al., 2006; Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jaggi & Tsui, 2007; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2008; Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010; Kent et al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012; Chen & Zhang, 2012; Leventis & Dimitropoulos, 2012; Anglin et al., 2013; Albu & Girbin, 2015) ; (ii) the effect of gender on EM (Krishnan & Parsons, 2008; Gavious et al., 2012) ; (iii) the impact of audit firm size on EM (Chia et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 2008) or audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981) ; (iv) the effect of terrorists attacks on EM (Iatridis, 2012) ; and (v) the effect of executive pay on EM (Cornett et al., 2008) .
Others have investigated the effect of religion/culture on: (i) EM/earnings quality (Callen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) and financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012) ; (ii) CSR (Brammer et al., 2007) and corporate philanthropy (iii) agency problems (Du, 2013) and tunnelling (Du, 2014) ; (iv) equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012) , corporate decision-making (Hilary & Hui, 2009 ) and risk-taking (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008) ; and (v) tax evasion/tax fraud (Stack 2006; Richardson 2008) and corruption (Mensah 2014) .
Finally, there are normative/critical reviews relating to the distinctiveness of IG srtuctures (Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010) and empirical evidence on how such IG mechanisms may drive corporate outcomes and practices, such as performance, CSR, risk-taking and EM (Safieddine, 2009; Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013; Ginena, 2014; Mollah & Zaman, 2015) .
Consequently, we draw on the above strands of the literature, behavioural theory (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) and relevant insights from the Omani corporate context to identify potential CG factors that may have effect on EM. Specifically, we examine how and why a broad composite CG index, the presence of an IG committee (i.e., Shariah supervisory board), board size, audit firm size, the presence of a CG committee and board diversity on the basis of gender, may affect a firm's EM practices.
Firm-level composite corporate governance index (OCGI) and earnings management
The dominant rational economics inspired agency theory suggests that managers are more likely to engage in EM because of the apparent conflict of interest that exists between managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . As a result, agency theory suggests that formal monitoring CG structures, bonding arrangments and incentive packagages can be instituted that may serve as a motivation for managers to produce reliable and transparent financial reports that minimise cases of EM (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) . This also implies that managers in poorly-governed firms are more likely to behave opportunistically by engaging in EM in order to benefit at the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders than those of better-governed firms.
A major limitation of the agency theory is that it assumes that managers have unlimited ability to continuously make rational decisions based on a full assessment of all available information that can result in optimal outcomes. However, the findings of recent studies based on behavioural theory (see e.g., reviews by Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) indicate that due to cognitive biases and information processing limitations, organisational actors are rarely able to fully assess all available alternatives during decision-making (i.e., managerial rationality is bounded). Instead pragmatic solutions that are typically satisfactory in terms of resolving immediate/current problems are sought. Such satisficing solutions are often inherent wihin organisational routines and heuristics based on known capabilities, beliefs, experiences, feelings/intutions, knowledge and value that are often taken-forgranted. Additonally, goal formation and emerging conflicts are resolved through continuous process of negotiation and political bargaining instead of via the alignment of rational economic motives of agents.
Therefore, divergence of managerial decisions from optimal outcomes (in this case, poor earnings quality or management) may not necessarily be attributed mainly to opportunistic and self-serving behaviour of managers, but instead to their cognitive weaknesses rooted in bounded rationality, a commitment towards achieving pragmatic and satisficing rather than theoretically oriented optimal solutions, often informed by trusted every day routines and heuristics based on past experiences, which usually would have emerged over many years of careful negotiations and political bargaining among coalitions of corporate stakeholders. This notwithstanding, it can be argued that in firms with better governance arrangements, rules underlying routines and heuristics, are more likely to have been better designed within an environment of healthy negotiations and political bargaining and thus, leading to a selection of satisficing decisions that minimise the extent of divergence from theoretically optimal solutions. In this case, bettergoverned firms can be expected to engage in less EM than their poorly-governed counterparts.
Empirically, whereas a number of studies have examined the relationship between a number of individual CG mechanisms and EM (e.g., Lin et al., 2006; Iatridis, 2012; Stockmans et al., 2013; Sun & Liu, 2013) , studies investigating the association between a broad composite CG index and EM are rare.
However, the limited studies that examine the association between firm-level EM and firm-level CG generally report that better-governed firms tend to engage less in EM (e.g., Bekiris et al., 2011; Leventis & Dimitropulos, 2012) . Within the Omani corporate setting, Capital Market Authority, Muscat Security Market and regulatory authorities are keen on encouraging firms towards adopting good CG practices with the expectation that they will have positive impact on corporate performance and practices, including disclosure, financial transparency and earnings quality. Given the negative predictions of the theoretical and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that the quality of CG, as proxied by a comprehensive CG index is expected to be negatively realted to EM. Hence, the first hypothesis of this paper is that:
H1. There is a negative association between the composite CG disclosure index and firm EM practices.
Islamic governance committee (IGC) and earnings management
From behavioural theoretical perspective (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) , the ability of corporate agents to reach optimal decisions is limited by cognitive biases and complex information processing weaknesses. Managerial decision-making process will, therefore, be dominated by pragmatic attempts at reaching satisficing rather than optimising outcomes through continuous negotiations and political bargaining among coalitions of stakeholders within routines and heuristics arising from well-established standard operating rules and procedures. Decision-making in this context will be influenced by prior managerial beliefs, emotions, experiences, intuitions/feelings and values rather than rational thought only. Arguably, this will be particularly important in the case of Oman, whereby the corporate context is characterised by corporate commitment to incorporate Islamic religious beliefs and values into corporate operations (Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005 ; Choudhury board subcommittees (e.g., remuneration, nomination, risk and audit), the IGC members 1 ought to have superior knowledge of Shariah law, as well as financial training and experience in order to facilitate appropriate evaluation and interpration of corporate decisions and disclosures. In the context of EM, the presence of the SSB may offer additional assurance to shareholders and other stakeholders that managers of firms' with such a committee are less likely to engage in EM compared with those without it. For instance, Shariah principles relating to accountability, honesty, integrity, responsibility, transparency and truthfulnes directly prohibit managers from engaging in fraudulent activities, such as EM.
Empirically, the findings of a limited number of studies suggest that Judo-Christian religious beliefs and values have a positive impact on: (i) EM/earnings quality (Callen et al., 2011; Du et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2015) and financial reporting irregularities (Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012) ; (ii) CSR (Brammer et al., 2007) and corporate philanthropy ; (iii) agency problems (Du, 2013) and tunnelling (Du, 2014) ; (iv) equity-pricing (El Ghoul et al., 2012) , corporate decisionmaking (Hilary & Hui, 2009 ) and risk-taking (Bartke & Schwarze, 2008) ; and (v) tax evasion/tax fraud (Stack 2006; Richardson 2008 ) and corruption (Mensah 2014) . Similarly and within Islamic research context, the findings of a limited number of studies suggest that IG mechanisms have a positive effect on:
(i) CG practices (Safieddine, 2009 ); (ii) risk management practices (Ginena, 2014) ; (iii) CSR practices (Farook et al., 2011; Rahman & Bukair, 2013) ; and (iv) financial performance (Mollah & Zaman, 2015) . Of direct relevance to our study and using a sample of 2,624 firm-year observations over 1993 , Quttainah et al. (2013 and following theoretical predictions, the second hypothesis of this paper is that:
H2. There is a negative association between Islamic governance committee and firm EM practices.
Board size (BSIZE) and earnings management
Conventional agency theory suggests that firms with larger boards are likely to be less effective in monitoring managers because such boards may suffer from poor coordination and communication problems (Jensen, 1993) , and thus allowing opportunistic managers to engage in self-serving behaviour by, for example, managing earnings upwards in order to boost their compensation packages (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . In this case, smaller boards are expected to provide more effective monitoring in reducing EM. An alternative perspective is that firms with larger boards have greater diversity in experience, technical expertise and skills, including accounting and financial knowledge than smaller boards. This implies that companies with larger boards are better placed to monitor managers, including the ability to detect financial reporting irregularities, such as EM (Pfeffer, 1972; Klein, 2002) . Thus, from this perspective, effective monitoring is more likely to be found in larger boards, which may help in reducing managers' incentive to engage in EM.
However, behavioural theory challenges the dominant rational economics led idea that always attributes questionable corporate behaviour and poor performance (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) , such as financial reporting mistakes to managerial motive to exploit corporate resources for their own benefits. In particular, behavioural theory suggests that there is a limit to the extent to which directors are able to think (cognitive biases), process complex information and make rational decisions (bounded rationality), and hence tend to engage in searching for satisficing rather than optimising solutions. Therefore, such managerial/corporate decisions may be based on formal and Empirically, a number of prior studies have provided some insights into the role of board size in mitigating EM, but their results are not only highly mixed, but also none (to the best of our knowledge) of them have examined it from a behavioural perspective and therefore, this offers genuine opportunities to contribute to the literature. For example, a negative relationship between board size and EM has been reported by Xie et al. (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2010) . In contrast, Rahaman and Ali (2006), Epps and Ismail (2009) and Alves (2012) offer empirical evidence that suggests that board size has a positive relationship with EM. Following the mixed empirical and theoretical suggestions, we predict a significant relationship between board size and EM without specifying the direction of the coefficient. Therefore, the third hypothesis proposed in this paper is that:
H3. There is a association between board size and firm EM practices.
Audit firm size (BIG4) and earnings management
Accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, emphasise the crucial role of audit quality,
where an external auditor's ability to professionally monitor managers by verifying financial statements is influenced by his/her qualities. One argument rooted in rational economics is that large audit firms have diverse set of skills, experiences, expertise, knowledge and financial resources, including information processing capabilities to provide high-quality audits than their smaller counterparts (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Uang et al., 2006) . Additionally, larger audit firms have higher reputation to protect compared with smaller audit firms, and thus have a lot to loose in case of post-audit detection of financial reporting irregularities, such as incidences of EM. Larger audit firms are, therefore, able to engage in effective audit negotiations, as well as challenge managerial decisions relating to a wide range of accounting transactions and treatments, and thereby able to expose financial reporting irregularities.
Together, these suggest that managers electing to be audited by larger audit firms are lesss likely to engage in EM compared to those audited by smaller audit firms, and therefore a negative relationship between audit firm size and EM can be expected.
However, these agency theoretic assumptions do not take into consideration the fact that auditors ability to make such rational decisions are limited (cognitively) and that auditors may not always be able to secure optimal solutions. This is particularly important for auditing because due to information processing limitations, auditors often select a sample of accounting transactions and treatments in order to test the accuracy of an entire accounting system of a corporation, as well as in forming a satisfactory audit opinion regarding the true and fair view of the underlying accounting treatments and transactions. Such satisficing audit decisions and opinions are often made by auditors based on their formal and informal experiences, beliefs, knowledge and values, which are usually rooted in a well established personal and corporate rules, processes, procedures and routines. We, therefore, suggest that behavioural theory offers a promising way of explaining why corporate decisions may sometimes deviate from optimal, such as failing to identify financial reporting irregularities/EM without necessarily assuming rational opportunistic behaviour of corporate actors and stakeholders.
Empirically, studies examining the association between audit firm size and EM practices are rare, although a negative relationship has been reported by a few previous studies (e.g., Chia et al., 2007; Francis & Wang, 2008; Kent et al., 2010; Iatridis, 2012) . In contrast, no significant association has been reported by some studies (e.g., Davidson et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2007) . One discernible limitation of these studies is that they are all informed by the ubiquitous rational economics inspired agency theory and thus, providing insights from a behavioural theoretical perspective has the potential to contribute to the literature by offering new theoretical insights. In line with the mixed empirical and theoretical suggestions, however, we predict a significant relationship between audit firm size and EM without specifying the direction of the coefficient. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis proposed in this paper is that:
H4. There is aassociation between audit firm size and firm EM practices.
Corporate governance committee (CGCOM) and earnings management
Given the increased focus on board composition, board committees are considered internal CG mechanisms that help the board to actively monitor managers. Among these committees, a CG committee, as its name implies, is expected to fulfil the important role of assisting the board in ensuring good CG practices within a firm. In this sense, a CG committee aims to promote CG practices by clearly defining governance arrangements and ensuring that the governance framework adopted by the firm is followed and updated. In particular and from a behavioural theoretical perspective, a CG committee may be able to assist in developing rules and routines based on corporate beliefs, experiences and values, which may lead to the achievement of satisficing solutions to CG challenges. Arguably, having a clear set of guidelines on best CG practices provided by a CG committee are more likely to reduce managers' discretion on financial reporting. Therefore, the theoretical prediction on the relationship between the presence of a CG committee and EM practices is more likely to be negative than positive.
Unlike other board committees (e.g., audit and executive committees), however, the presence of a CG committee and its potential impact on EM has not been empirically investigated in the literature and hence, evaluating the extent to which the presence of a CG committee may drive corporate EM practices may help in expanding current understanding of an important aspect of corporate accounting behaviour.
However, prior studies have shown that the presence of a CG committee impacts positively on: (i) CG disclosures (Ntim et al, 2012a) ; (ii) risk disclosures ; (iii) CSR disclosures (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) ; (iv) performance (Ntim, 2015; Ntim et al., 2015b) ; and (iv) executive compensation (Ntim et al., 2015b) . The presence of a CG committee can, therefore, be expected to restrain the extent of EM and therefore, the fifth hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that:
H5. There is a negative association between the presence of a CG committee and firm EM practices. financial reports and detecting any financial reporting irregularities (Pfeffer, 1972; Nielsen and Huse, 2010) . Arguably, a mix of male and female non-executive directors on a board may not only help in improving managerial monitoring as inherent in the rational agency theoretical perspective, but also in reaching better satisficing decisions by bringing stronger emotional intelligence into the corporate board decision-making process and thereby potential minimising incidences of EM (Adams & Ferreia, 2009 , Srinidhi et al., 2011 .
Board diversity on the basis of gender (GNDR) and earnings management
Empirically, most previous studies (e.g., Clikeman et al., 2001; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008) mainly examine the effect of gender on earnings quality by considering female members of senior managers. In contrast, studies examining the impact of gender on earnings quality that consider the presence of females on corporate boards are limited (e.g., Srinidhi et al., 2011; Gavious et al., 2012) . Given the theoretical prediction and empirical literature, it can be hypothesised that board diversity on the basis of gender is likely to negatively influence EM. Hence, the final hypothesis to be tested in this paper is that:
H6. There is a negative association between board diversity on the basisof gender and firm EM practices.
Data and research methodology

Data: Sample selection, sources and description
The dataset used in our paper is drawn from the population of Omani firms listed on Muscat Security Market during 2001 to 2011, and Table 1 contains a summary of the sample seclection procedure.
The initial sample consisted of 168 firms as of December 2011. To determine the final sample, we excluded some firms based on the following criteria Insert + ε it (1), where TAC refers to total accruals in year t for firm i, which is calculated as net income minus operating cash flow. TA refers to total assets in year t-1 for firm i. ∆Rev refers to revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i. PPE refers to gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i. εit is the idiosyncratic error term in year t for firm i. All variables are divided by lagged total assets in order to mitigate any potential heteroskedasticity problems, and the cash flow approach is adopted in order to calculate total 2 There were three main reasons for setting these criteria. First, the data collection started with financial year 2001 since it was the first year for which data was available. Second, the sample ends in the 2011 because it was the latest year for which data was available. Finally, using fewer than 10 observations can render the estimated coefficients inefficient since the EM measures used in this study require an estimation of a cross-sectional regression for each industry (McNichols, 2000) . Using these criteria, and as outlined in Table 1 , the sample procedure produced unbalanced panel data of 116 unique firms (i.e., a total of 1,152 firm year observations over the 11 years investigated). To the best of our knowledge, this is by far the largest dataset to be used in any Middle Eastern and North African study on CG to date. We collected all our CG data from corporate annual reports, which were downloaded from the Perfect Information Database and Muscat Security Market website, whilst financial (i.e., accounting and market) data was collected from DataStream. accruals, which is in line with a considerable number of prior studies (e.g., Hribar et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 2005; Chen & Zhang, 2012) .
Second, the coefficients estimated from equation (1) (2), where everything remains the same as defined in equation (1) except that ‫ܥܧܴ∆‬ ௧ is included, which presents receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i. Finally, the amount of discretionary accruals (DA), which we use as evidence of the extent of EM is calculated by using the following equation: DA ௧ = TAC it TA it-1 -NDA it (3). Second, we use the 2005 Kothari et al. model to measure EM in order to check the robustness of our findings to alternative EM estimation techniques that takes into account the managerial opportunity to engage in real earnings manipulations rather than through discretaionary accruals (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2005 Kothari et al., , 2015 . Observably, the two models have been chosen for the following reasons: (i) there is no theory that specifies which of the models produces better EM estimates;
(ii) data limitations implies that we are unable to implement every model available; and (iii) the two models have been widely used in the extant literature (e.g., Jiang et al., 2008; Sun & Liu, 2013) to examine EM and therefore, their validity have been widely tested. Further, we adopt signed discretionary accruals rather than absolute abnormal accruals because we intend to measure firm-level EM in the presence of a particular directional prediction as the relation between signed abnormal accruals and CG variables can be predicted (Bowen et al., 2008) . Second, our main independent variable is a composite CG index. Following suggestions in the prior literature that CG can be better examined by a composite CG index (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008 ), we measured firm-level CG by using comprehensive CG index. Among the two commonly used measures of CG indices are: researcher constructed; and (ii) subjective analysts' CG rankings/indices. We construct our own index instead using subjective analysts' CG indices/rankings for three main reasons. The OCGI is constructed mainly based on the 2002 Omani code of CG. The eight CG themes contained in the code were categorised into four broad sections in order to extract CG provisions.
This resulted in 72 individual CG provisions falling under four broad sections: (i) board of directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; and (iv) disclosure and transparency. Some CG provisions contained in the 1974 Companies Act had to be added into the OCGI in order to achieve a comprehensive CG index. The OCGI is considered to be reliable as the Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the four categories in the OCGI is 0.78, suggesting that a random measurement error is less likely to reduce the power of the empirical tests (Pallant, 2010) . The OCGI's construction was also guided by those of previsous CG studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a, b) . First, most subjective analysts' CG rankings are designed by international professional organisations; hence may not be applicable to the Omani corporate context due to differences in CG regimes. Second, there is no national professional organisation in Oman, which publishes ready to be used CG indices. Third, unlike subjective analysts' CG rankings, our constructed index is a direct measure of actual CG disclosure and covers a wide range of internal CG disclosure items (Lang & Lundholm, 1993; Donelly & Mulcahy, 2008) . Thus, we constructed a comprehensive Omani CG index (OCGI). The OCGI is constructed mainly based on the 2002 Omani code of CG. The eight CG themes contained in the code were categorised into four broad sections in order to extract CG provisions. This resulted in 72 individual CG provisions falling under four broad sections:
(i) board of directors; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) external auditors and internal control systems; and (iv) disclosure and transparency. Some CG provisions contained in the 1974 Companies Act had to be added into the OCGI in order to achieve a comprehensive CG index. The OCGI is considered to be reliable as the Cronbach's coefficient alpha for the four categories in the OCGI is 0.78, suggesting that a random measurement error is less likely to reduce the power of the empirical tests (Pallant, 2010) . The OCGI's construction was also guided by those of previsous CG studies (e.g., Ntim et al., 2012a, b) . The CG score-sheet was designed to code firms on their level of CG practices, and the annual reports of the 116 firms were analysed and compared with the OCGI's provisions. A score of 1 was assigned if a particular CG provision was applied, and 0 otherwise. The degree of CG's practices level for each firm was aggregated and expressed as a percentage, with the scoring ranging from complete non-compliance (zero score -0%) to perfect compliance (a score of 72 -100%).
The IG committee represents our third group of variables that we use in our study, which is uniquely relevant to the Omani corporate context. The fourth group of variables that we empoly in our analysis include other CG variables (i.e., board size, audit firm size , the presence of a CG committee, and board diversity on the basis of gender). Our final group of variables is our control variables, consisting of ownership (i.e., block ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership) and other firm-specific characteristics (i.e., firm size, profitability, growth, leverage, industry dummy, and year dummy). Table 2 presents summary definitions of all variables includeded in our models.
Insert Table 2 about here We begin our analysis by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as our initial estimation method and multiple linear regression as a statistical technique to examine the extent to which CG and IG can influence EM. Assuming all predicted relationships are linear, firm-level EM as a dependent variable were regressed on several explanatory variables as specified in the following regression model: Where DA refers to discretionary accruals, OCGI is the Omani CG index, IGC is Islamic governance committee, BSIZE is the board size, BIG4 is audit firm size, CGCOM is the presence of a CG committee, and GNDR is board diversity on the basis of gender. CONTROLS refers to control variables, including ownership variables, consisting of block ownership (BLKOWN), foreign ownership (FOROWN), government ownership (GOVOWN) and institutional ownership (INSOWN) and firm-specific characteristics, namely firm size (LNTA), growth (GROWTH), profitability, (ROA), leverage (LVRG), industry, and year dummies. Similarly, the statistics in Panels B, C, D and E of Table 3 suggest that there is substantial degree of dispersion in the distribution of each sub-index, as well as similar increasing levels of compliance with respect to each sub-index over the period of our examination. For instance, the board and directors' subindex ranges from 0% to 97.44% with the average corporations complying with 38.59%. Omani firms appear to have relatively higher compliance with both accounting and auditing provisions (75.37%), and disclosure and transparency provisions (64.04%), intermediate level of compliance with the board and directors provisions (38.59%), and lower level of compliance with external auditors and internal control systems provisions (2.43%). The key conclusion from examining the level of compliance with the 72 individual CG provisions is that despite the initial theoretical prediction that the issuance of the 2002 CG code would effectively encourage firms to adopt better CG measures, CG compliance among Omani listed firms is still low. Further, the evidence that emerges from Table 3 Insert Table 3 about here   Second, Table 4 presents descriptive statistics relating to the EM, as well as the rest of the explanatory variables. For example, it shows that EM, denoted by the signed discretionary accruals (DA), ranges from a minimum of -0.1946 to a maximum of 0.3301, with an average of 0.0304 over the period of our examination. This reveals that Omani listed firms, on average, appear to manage their earnings upwards with average abnormal accruals equal to about 3% of lagged total assets. Overall, the average DA is consistent with the figures reported by a number of past studies (e.g., Mitra and Cready, 2005; Jiang et al., 2008; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011) . We observe similar wide spreads among the explanatory and control variables. For instance, block ownership, labelled as BLKOWN ranges from 0.0000 to 0.9947 with an average of 55%.
Empirical results and discussions
Empirical results: Descriptive statistics and univariate regression analysis
Insert Table 4 about here In addition to the statistical analysis that we conduct before examining our main research hypotheses, we test a number of OLS assumptions, including the presence of multicollinearity problems amon the variables. Table 5 presents the correlation matrix to test for multi-collinearity problems. As a robustness check, we report both the Pearson's parametric and Spearman's non-parametric coefficients.
Generally, the coefficients indicate that no serious multicollinearities among all the variables used.
Further, a number of statistical analysis were carried out (which for brevity are not reported here, but wiil be available on request) in order to test for other OLS assumptions before examining our hypotheses.
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Insert Table 5 about here Table 6 reports the effect of the OCGI, IG committee (IGC) and other CG variables (board size -BSIZE; audit firm size -BIG4; the presence of a CG committee -CGCOM; and board gender diversity -GNDR) on EM. Generally, Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 present the findings of the main Model related to the effect of CG on EM. These findings indicate that OCGI and IGC are significant in explaining crosssectional differences in the DA. First, the negative coefficient on the OCGI is in line with our behavioural theoretical framework, which suggests that the capacity of managers and corporate boards to think, process complex information and decide rationally is cognitively limited (bounded rationality) (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) . Therefore, managers tend to take pragmatic steps that are often aimed at securing satisficing ("satisficing behaviour and problemistic search") rather than optimising (rational economic behaviour) solutions by following well-established corporate beliefs, knowledge, values, rules, procedures, processes and routines ("routinisation of decisionmaking") that have usually been developed based on careful negotiations and political bargaining ("political bargaining in the context of corporations as coalitions of stakeholders") among a coalition of corporate stakeholders (van Ees et al., 2009, pp.311-312) . Thus, deviations from optimal solutions and in this case, evidence of EM behaviour may not necessarily be explained by incentives of managers to self-serve their rational economic interests (e.g., to increase executive pay by managing earnings upwards and thereby expropriating corporate resources), but instead due to cognitive biases (bounded rationality) and pratical (complex information collection and processing challenges) limitations that may motivate managers to pragmatically seek satsisficing solutions to current problems. The findings offer further support to the behavioural theory's suggestions that informal interactions, relationships, discussions, emotions, experiences, beliefs and values are equally important in determining the effectiveness of CG structures. Empirially, the negative association between DA and the OCGI provides support for H1 and the findings of past studies (e.g., Mitra & Credy, 2005; Jiraporn & Gleason, 2007; Cornett et al., 2008; Wang, 2014) , who report evidence that suggests that companies with good CG practices tend to engage less in EM compared with those with poor CG structures. Second, our model shows that IGC is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance, suggesting that H2 is also empirically supported. The evidence is largely in line with the predictions of our behavioural theoretical framework. Specfically and from behavioural theoretical perspective (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) , we argue that the ability of corporate agents to reach optimal decisions is limited by cognitive biases and complex information processing weaknesses. Managerial decision-making process will, therefore, be dominated by pragmatic attempts at reaching satisficing rather than optimising outcomes through continuous negotiations and political bargaining among coalitions of stakeholders within routines and heuristics arising from wellestablished standard operating rules and procedures. Decision-making in this context will be influenced by prior managerial beliefs, emotions, experiences, intuitions/feelings and values rather than rational thought and economic opportunism only. Arguably, this will be particularly important in the case of Oman, whereby the corporate context is characterised by corporate commitment to incorporate Islamic religious beliefs and values into business operations (Archer et al., 1998; Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Kamla et al., 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Williams & Zinkin, 2010; Mollah & Zaman, 2015) . A prominent way by which the Omani corporate decision-making process can be guided by Islamic religious beliefs and values is through the establishment of the IGC in the form of the SSB. As previously noted, the main role of SSB is to offer guidance as to whether corporate investments, operations and activities are in lines with rules, beliefs, tenets and values of Islamic Shariah law. In the context of EM, the presence of the SSB may offer additional assurance to shareholders and other stakeholders that managers of firms with such a committee are less likely to engage in EM compared with those without it.
Empirical results: OLS (multivariate) regression analysis
For instance, Shariah principles relating to accountability, honesty, integrity, responsibility, transparency and truthfulnes directly prohibit managers from engaging in fraudulent activities, such as EM.
Empirically, it offers new insights on the effect of IG on EM, as well as lends support to the result of Hamdi and Zarai (2014) . Third, our model predicts no significant relationship between each of board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), and board gender diversity (GNDR), and DA, implying that H3, H4, H5 and H6 are, respectively, not empirically supported. Finally, to ascertain how sensitie the findings are to our DA measure, we include several control (ownership and other firm-specific characteristics) variables in Models 1 to 8 with all the findings being largely consistent across the eight Models. With specific reference to the control variables, our findings suggest that firms with high growth (GROWTH), leverage (LVRG), profitability (ROA) and block ownership (BLKOWN) tend to engage significantly more in EM, whereas those with high government ownership (GOVOWN) and institutional ownership (INSOWN) tend to engage significantly less in EM, and thereby offering additional new insights and contributions regarding the effect of CG, ownership and other firm-specific variables on the extent of corporate EM.
Furthermore, Models 2 to 4 present the effect of each group of variables on EM. In doing so, only the effect of the OCGI as an integrated system on EM in addition to control variables are included in Model 2 as reported by Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 . We find similar findings to those reported in the main Model indicating that the OCGI is statistically significant and negatively associated with DA at the 10% level of significance. Discernibly, the control variables also show significant relationships with DA. In addition, to examine the effect of the IGC separately from the other explanatory variables, Column 6 and 7
of Table 6 repeat Model 3 findings of multivariate regression of DA on the IGC and control variables with the findings contained in Colums 6 and 7 of Table 6 indicating that all the variables remain statistically significant. Thus, our evidence that the presence of an IG committee tend to constrain the extent of EM is robust to the inclusion of the other control variables. Similarly, the other CG variables (BSIZE, BIG4, CGCOM and GNDR) along with the control variables were examined separately from the OCGI and IGC in order to observe their impact on EM. The findings of this analysis that are also largely consistent with those contained in the main model are reported in Columns 8 and 9 of Table 6 .
Moreover, in order to investigate which of the four sub-indies contributes more to DA, we reregress equation (1) by replacing the OCGI with each sub-index one at a time. Statistically significant and negative effect of board and directors, and accounting and auditing on DA is observable in Models 5 and 6 of Table 6 , while Models 7 and 8 show that external auditors and internal control systems and disclosure and transparency have negative effect on DA, but statistically insignificant.
Insert Table 6 about here
Robustness analysis
We conduct a series of robustness estimations to examine the extent to which our main findings are robust or sensitive to the use of: (i) alternative CG weighted index; (ii) alternative EM's proxy; (iii) financial firms inclusion; (iv) the pre-and post-2002 CG Code issuance; and (v) any potential endogeneity problems. The findings of these analyses are presented in Models 2 to 7 of Table 7 with the findings contained in Model 1 repeating our previous main findings in order to facilitate easy comparative analysis.
First, we account for the likelihood that using weighted CG index may result in different findings. As explained earlier, un-weighted index was used to perform our main analysis where all 72 CG provisions constituting the four sub-indies of the OCGI have different weightings. The four sub-indies include 39, 7, 4, and 22 CG provisions contributing to the OCGI by 54%, 10%, 6% and 30%, respectively. Following prior studies' procedure in constructing weighted CG index (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006) , an alternative OCGI was constructed in which each sub-index was scored by awarding similar weight of 25%. We replaced our un-weighted OCGI with the weighted OCGI in equation (4), and the findings are reported in Model 2 of Table 7 , with the results indicating that our main Model's findings are not sensitive to using a weighted CG index.
Insert Table 7 about here Second, we replicate our main analysis by using a different measure of EM developed by Kothari et al. (2005) in order to examine whether our main findings are sensitive to the DA's proxy employed that explicitly takes the likelihood of real earnings manipulations into account (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008; Kothari et al., 2005 Kothari et al., , 2015 . The results presented in Model 3 of Table 7 suggest that our evidence is robust to the use of this alternative EM measure. Third, we account for the possibility that the inclusion of financial companies 4 in our data set may lead to different results by re-regressing equation (4) the Hausman test is employed to detect the existence of any endogeneity problems. The test is made up of two stages. In the first stage and as specified in equation (5) below, the OCGI is regressed on the control variables and its resulting predicted values are saved as P_OCGI.
Where the OCGI refers to the Omani CG index and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, which are the same as those used in equation (4). In the second stage, the OCGI and P_OCGI in addition to the control variables are included in the following equation.
4
As previously noted, both financial and non-financial firms were included in the main analysis. In this regard, and although the nature of financial firms' accruals may differ from those of non-financial firms, prior studies that examine the relation between CG and EM have not provided any empirical evidence to confirm the theoretical argument that the impact of CG on accruals in non-financial firms is not comparable to those in financial firms because the latter are subject to more specific accounting requirements. As a result, we aim to provide empirical evidence of whether there is a significant difference in CG's influence on EM between financial and non-financial firms in an emerging country like Oman. 5 The potential of this problem arises when the OCGI assumed to be exogenous in equation (4) is associated with the error term because an important control variable is not included in the model (e.g., unavailability of data) and/or when the dependent variable simultaneously determines the independent variable (Wooldridge, 2009).
Where DA refers to the discretionary accruals measured by the 1995 modified Jones Model, OCGI refers to the Omani CG index, P_OCGI refers to the predicted values of the OCGI and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, which are the same as those used in equation (4), with the test rejecting the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. In this sense, the 2SLS technique was performed as follows. In the first stage, the OCGI is assumed to be determined by the six control variables and four new alternative CG variables.
6 The first stage regression is specified as follows (for brevity, the first stage results are not reported here, but will be available upon request).
Where OCGI refers to the Omani CG index, BDIV, NEXD, NBMs, and CAPEX are defined as board diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, the number of board's directors meetings, and capital expenditure, respectively. CONTROLS refers to control variables which are the same as those used in equation (4). The predicted value of the OCGI is saved and referred to it as P_OCGI, as well as the residuals is saved and referred to it as R_OCGI. The correlation matrix (which for brevity is not reported here, but will be made available upon request) shows that the predicted value of the OCGI (P_OCGI) is highly correlated with the OCGI and lowly correlated with the R_OCGI, indicating that the P_OCGI is relevant and valid instrument for the OCGI. In the second stage, equation (4) is re-estimated by using the P_OCGI instead of the OCGI as specified below.
Where everthing remains the same as those used in equation (4) Table   7 .
7 Overall, our sensitivity analysis suggests that our results are fairly robust to alternative CG/EM measures and estimation techniques, including any potential endogeneities.
Summary and conclusion
6 The choice of the alternative CG variables is based on the theoretical literature, empirical literature and the availability of data. Drawing from prior literature (e.g., Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Vafeas, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Petra, 2005; Bowen et al., 2008; McCabe & Nowak, 2008; Tariq et al., 2014) , the four new alternative CG variables include, board diversity on the basis of nationality, the number of non-executive directors on the board, capital expenditure and the number of board meetings.
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Additionally and in an untabulated results, we conduct fixed-effect estimation in order to account for the potential existence of firm-level hetereogenities, such as company culture -with the central tenor of our findings remaining qualitatively or essentially the same, as reported previously.
Although a considerable number of studies have examined the effect of a number of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms on the extent of corporate earnings management (EM), their findings are largely mixed. Discernibly, existing studies have a number of limitations, including being informed mainly by the ubiquitous rational economics theory of agency, focusing primarily on developing countries and investigating mostly the effect of individual CG mechanisms on the extent of EM. By contrast, empirical evidence on why and how a firm's CG might influence its level of EM is generally limited in developing countries, but particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa region. Additionally, despite increasing evidence that the heavy reliance on the dominant rational agency theory is unable to provide a full explanation for magerial motivation to engage in EM and that there is a need to consider alternative theoretical perspectives, none of the existing studies have explicitly informed their analysis by drawing, for example, on the insights of behavioural theory of corporate boards and governance (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; van Ees et al., 2009; Huse et al., 2011) . Arguably, these developments limit current international understanding of how and why CG might constrain or facilitate corporate EM in different corporate contexts. Therefore, this paper has examined the effect of the quality of firm-level CG and Islamic governance (IG) committee on the extent of EM in Oman from 2001 to 2011. This coincides with a period in which the Omani authorities pursued CG reforms that were aimed at improving corporate performance and practices, including enhancing corporate disclosure and the quality of financial reports.
Apart from articulating and applying behavioural theoretical perspective, which may be used by future studies in interpreting their results, our findings makes a number of new contributions to the extant CG literature. First, despite the theoretical expectation that the introduction of the 2002 Omani voluntary CG Code will facilite uniformity and convergence of CG practices, the findings from our extensive summary descriptive statistics suggest that CG standards in Omani listed corporations still differ widely over the eleven years investigated. Whereas the level of variability observed is comparable to those reported by prior studies, it seems to indicate that some degree of hetereogeneity exists when it comes to the importance that Omani listed corporations attach to CG practices. However, despite concerns that a voluntary CG Code may be ineffective in raising CG standards in Omani corporations given the context, our findings suggest that there has been gradual and observable improvement in CG standards over the eleven years investigated. Second, we find that, on average, better-governed corporations tend to engage significantly less in EM than their poorly-governed counterparts. This offers the first empirical evidence on the effect of the Omani CG reforms on the extent of EM among Omani listed firms, and seems to suggest that adopting a UK-style CG regime appears to be working to a certain degree in mitigating EM. Third, we also find that corporations that have established IG committees engage significantly less in EM. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that board size, audit firm size, the presence of a CG committee, and board gender diversity have any significant relationship with the extent of corporate EM.
Our results are fairly robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently account for alternative CG and EM proxies, as well as potential endogeneity problems. Overall, our findings are generally consistent with the predictions of our behavioural theoretical framework.
Our results have a number of important implications for policy-makers and regulatory authorities. Whether there is a narrative on how the firm is doing its activities in order to achieve its objectives. Table 5 Pearson's and Spearman's correlation matrices of the dependent, independent, and control variables Coeff.
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